Is crew welfare becoming a measurable maritime risk?

November 1 ------ IUMI’s new Crew Wellbeing Checklist signals a shift in how maritime insurers consider the human element in hull risk assessment. However, important questions remain about how the industry measures crew welfare, verifies actual conditions onboard and connects wellbeing with operational risk.

For decades, maritime risk assessment has focused primarily on vessel condition, machinery reliability, claims history and management standards. Yet even the most technically advanced ship depends on the people responsible for its operation.

Fatigue, excessive workload, inadequate rest and poor living conditions can affect judgement, concentration and operational performance. These are longstanding safety concerns, but their consideration within marine insurance is now becoming more structured.

The development reflects a broader evolution in crew welfare over the past two decades: from establishing minimum regulatory protections towards measuring working conditions, evaluating management practices and considering their implications for safety and business performance. However, an important distinction remains. Recognizing crew welfare as a risk factor does not automatically mean that its contribution to casualties or insurance claims can be reliably quantified.

What the IUMI checklist tells us about changing risk priorities

The checklist goes beyond traditional employment and welfare compliance by asking questions that may reveal weaknesses in operational management.

One notable example concerns fatigue. IUMI asks not only whether a fatigue risk management system exists, but whether hours-of-rest records are periodically verified against objective evidence, including port calls and logbook entries. This distinction is particularly relevant given longstanding concerns about the accuracy of recorded working hours.

Research by the World Maritime University (WMU) has highlighted discrepancies between recorded rest hours and actual working practices, raising questions about the reliability of compliance documentation as evidence of effective fatigue management.

For insurers, such information may provide useful context when examining safety management practices and the circumstances surrounding incidents. The checklist also asks whether crew feedback is systematically collected, reviewed and acted upon, whether near-misses are routinely discussed, and whether fatigue and other human-factor indicators are incorporated into incident and claims analysis. These questions move beyond the existence of procedures towards how effectively management systems operate.

Another significant development is the inclusion of everyday living conditions. Questions about food allowances, internet connectivity, shore leave, contract duration and crew retention recognize that working and living conditions may influence the wider operational environment. The checklist also addresses wage payments, recruitment fees, abandonment, post-incident support, harassment and confidential reporting. Taken together, these areas suggest a broader understanding of risk, one that considers the organizational and employment conditions surrounding shipboard operations alongside technical and procedural safeguards.

The missing perspective: What do seafarers actually experience?

One of the main challenges in assessing crew welfare is the difference between what companies provide and what seafarers experience onboard.

The 2025 SEAFiT Crew Survey, covering 21,775 seafarers across 1,703 vessels, illustrates why direct crew feedback remains important. While the survey recorded an overall SEAFiT Index of 70.1%, its Wellbeing Index stood considerably lower at 61.1%, highlighting differences between individual aspects of crew welfare. This distinction is particularly relevant to IUMI’s checklist. An operator may report that internet connectivity, recreational facilities or mental health support are available. However, the existence of these provisions does not necessarily demonstrate their accessibility, quality or effectiveness.

Similarly, documented rest-hour compliance cannot independently establish that seafarers receive sufficient recovery time, particularly where operational demands and workload pressures affect daily routines.

The two approaches therefore provide different types of evidence. IUMI’s checklist establishes whether companies have welfare policies and management arrangements in place, while crew surveys can reveal gaps in their implementation and effectiveness.

For example, a company may report compliance with rest-hour requirements, while seafarers identify excessive workloads or insufficient recovery time. Similarly, the provision of internet access or mental health support may meet company standards without adequately addressing crew needs.

Such discrepancies should prompt closer examination of the underlying causes. Repeated concerns about fatigue could be assessed alongside working-hour records, manning arrangements and incident reports, while poor feedback on living conditions could inform reviews of onboard provisions and crewing policies. The value of combining these sources lies in identifying where documented arrangements differ from actual conditions, enabling companies to investigate specific weaknesses and assess whether corrective measures lead to measurable improvements.

From documented compliance to actual welfare performance

The distinction between policies and actual conditions presents one of the main challenges in assessing crew welfare.

Shipping companies already operate within an extensive regulatory framework, particularly through the Maritime Labor Convention, 2006, which establishes minimum standards for working and living conditions. Yet compliance does not necessarily demonstrate the consistency or effectiveness of welfare practices across an entire fleet.

As previously explored in SAFETY4SEA’s analysis of why MLC compliance alone is not enough to protect seafarers, the presence of appropriate procedures and certificates cannot independently establish that acceptable conditions are maintained throughout daily operations.

The IUMI checklist creates an opportunity to examine these issues from another perspective. However, it is designed to be completed ashore by the broker or assured’s insurance manager, using information already available to the operator. It does not require additional forms to be completed by crews onboard. This makes the process practical, particularly during insurance renewal discussions, but also places considerable importance on the quality and reliability of the information supplied.

A company may report the existence of anti-harassment policies, confidential reporting arrangements or mental health support. Determining whether these measures are effective requires more than confirmation that they exist.

Similarly, knowing the daily food allowance per seafarer does not establish nutritional quality, just as recording the availability of shore leave does not necessarily explain whether crews can regularly take advantage of it. "For a meaningful assessment, documentary evidence needs to be considered alongside implementation, crew feedback and corrective action." Otherwise, there is a risk that welfare assessment becomes another reporting requirement without producing a clearer understanding of actual conditions onboard.

Can better crew welfare lead to lower insurance claims?

The relationship between crew welfare and operational safety is increasingly recognized, but the question of insurance pricing requires greater caution.

Fatigue, stress and excessive workloads can contribute to impaired decision-making and reduced situational awareness. These factors are relevant to loss prevention, incident investigation and safety management.

This provides reasonable grounds for insurers to examine welfare-related practices as part of their wider risk assessments. However, using welfare indicators to determine insurance premiums requires evidence that they can reliably predict future claims or losses. Such evidence would need to demonstrate a consistent relationship across comparable vessels and operators over time, while accounting for other factors influencing claims experience.

A company with stronger welfare practices may also have better maintenance systems, more experienced crews, higher retention, stronger safety management and greater organizational resources. Any difference in claims performance would therefore need to be examined carefully before attributing it to particular welfare initiatives.

Likewise, higher food expenditure, improved connectivity or greater crew satisfaction should not automatically be treated as evidence of reduced hull risk.

For now, its clearest application is in supporting underwriting discussions, identifying potential vulnerabilities and strengthening the consideration of human factors within loss-prevention activities. Whether crew welfare will eventually become a measurable factor in insurance pricing remains an open question.

Measuring crew welfare: The next challenge

The growing availability of welfare-related information raises another question: how can shipping companies determine whether their approach is improving?

A useful distinction can be made between recognizing a welfare problem, taking action to address it and demonstrating that the action has produced meaningful results.

Consider fatigue management. Training, procedures and accurate rest-hour records are necessary elements of prevention. Yet their effectiveness also depends on workload, manning arrangements, watch schedules and opportunities for recovery.

Similarly, providing access to mental health services is important, but management also needs to understand whether seafarers know how to access support, trust its confidentiality and can use it when needed. This is where the development of more consistent welfare measurement practices could become particularly valuable.

Rather than examining individual initiatives in isolation, companies could consider how welfare-related information connects with existing safety indicators, including fatigue reports, near-misses, incident investigations, retention patterns and operational performance. The purpose should not be to create a single score that claims to explain every aspect of crew welfare.

It should be to identify recurring weaknesses, assess whether corrective measures are effective and strengthen the evidence available for management decisions.

What does this mean for maritime leadership?

The IUMI initiative brings several management functions into closer consideration.

Crew welfare is often addressed through crewing, human resources or dedicated wellbeing programs. Operational risk, safety performance and insurance arrangements may be managed through separate processes. Yet the factors examined by IUMI cut across these responsibilities.

Fatigue management involves crewing levels, voyage schedules and operational demands. Shore leave depends partly on port arrangements and commercial considerations. Psychological safety is connected with leadership, communication and trust. Incident support involves both operational management and employment responsibilities.

Addressing these issues effectively therefore requires coordination across company functions. For senior management, several questions deserve attention:

• Do existing risk assessments adequately consider fatigue, workload and other welfare-related factors?

• Are company welfare policies supported by reliable evidence of implementation onboard?

• How are crew survey findings connected with safety reports, incident investigations and management reviews?

• Can the company demonstrate improvements in working and living conditions over time?

• Are emerging welfare concerns addressed through operational changes where necessary, rather than awareness initiatives alone?

These questions are relevant regardless of whether insurers eventually introduce formal welfare-related pricing criteria. They concern the ability of shipping companies to understand and manage risks that may affect both seafarers and vessel operations.

Looking ahead

"IUMI’s Crew Wellbeing Checklist represents a development in how maritime insurers consider the human element in operational risk assessment." It also raises a wider question for shipping companies: how can crew welfare be assessed consistently and meaningfully, beyond documented compliance and the existence of individual initiatives?

The answer will require a combination of reliable management information, direct seafarer feedback and operational evidence. It will also require caution when interpreting welfare indicators, particularly where their relationship with insurance claims has not yet been established. A stronger evidence base may eventually allow the industry to better understand the relationship between crew welfare, safety performance and insurance outcomes.

Until then, an important distinction must be maintained between recognizing the relevance of crew welfare and demonstrating its measurable contribution to risk reduction.

The challenge is not simply to recognize crew welfare as a risk factor, but to demonstrate whether improvements in working and living conditions contribute to safer operations.

Source: safety4sea.com