RiskIntelligence: Hybrid threats may increasingly target seafarers

October 3 ------ Maritime hybrid threats could increasingly extend beyond shadow fleet vessels to the recruitment, coercion and exploitation of seafarers, port workers and other personnel across the global maritime ecosystem, according to Kristian Bischoff, Senior Analyst, Europe and Russia, at RiskIntelligence.

In his analysis, Bischoff argues that while the Russian-aligned shadow fleet remains a key concern in relation to sanctions evasion and maritime security, focusing primarily on vessel ownership and affiliations could overlook a broader human dimension. State-linked actors could potentially exploit ordinary commercial vessels and maritime personnel for intelligence collection, influence operations or disruptive activity.

Bischoff draws a parallel with the growing “crime-as-a-service” model used by organized criminal networks, in which decentralized facilitators provide access to local knowledge, logistics, documentation, transportation or other capabilities without being directly integrated into the wider organization.

In addition, the maritime sector has long been exposed to this model through drug trafficking, with criminal networks recruiting or coercing port workers, customs officials, crew members and logistics personnel. According to the analysis, similar methods could potentially be used in hybrid operations, allowing state-linked actors to outsource specific tasks to individuals who may not know the broader purpose of an operation.

Commercial vessels could provide intelligence opportunities

The potential threat, according to Bischoff, extends beyond vessels directly associated with Russia. Ordinary merchant vessels operating near naval bases, offshore energy installations, military training areas or other critical infrastructure could potentially provide opportunities for intelligence collection.

A recruited individual aboard a commercial vessel could, for example, be asked to collect photographs, record vessel movements, monitor security procedures or document infrastructure. While individual pieces of information may appear insignificant, repeated collection across multiple vessels and locations could contribute to a wider intelligence picture.

The analysis also highlights the possibility of personnel being used for more disruptive activities, including potentially operating small drones or conducting other limited operations from an otherwise legitimate commercial vessel. Examples from narcotics trafficking demonstrate that recruitment can involve individual crew members or, in some cases, entire crews. Bischoff argues that these established criminal patterns demonstrate how legitimate maritime access can potentially be exploited by other types of actors.

Coercion adds another layer of risk

The analysis also points to established coercion methods used in organized crime, including threats against family members, debt pressure, blackmail, immigration-related vulnerabilities and intimidation.

Seafarers may face particular vulnerabilities because they work far from home, spend extended periods away from support networks and often operate within multinational crews. Individuals with family, financial or other connections in countries where Russian influence remains significant could potentially face additional pressure, according to the analysis.

However, the assessment stresses that this should not translate into treating seafarers as inherently suspicious. The overwhelming majority of maritime personnel carry out their duties professionally and lawfully. Instead, the analysis suggests that maritime security and company risk assessments should recognize the possibility that individual personnel could become targets for recruitment, coercion or exploitation.

A broader maritime security challenge

Unlike conventional attacks against vessels or infrastructure, human-centric hybrid activity could exploit legitimate access and normal commercial operations.

For shipping companies, this also creates a duty-of-care consideration. Seafarers potentially exposed to recruitment or coercion may themselves become victims of malign activity, rather than willing participants.

The analysis concludes that the shadow fleet could therefore represent only the most visible element of a wider hybrid threat environment. As state-linked actors increasingly exploit decentralized networks and legitimate commercial access, people working across vessels, ports, terminals, offshore facilities and maritime supply chains could become an increasingly important security consideration.

Source: safety4sea.com